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The role of public infrastructure and subsidies for firm location
and international outsourcing
Abstract
This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input
production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad.
The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (FTA). It is
shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the
number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country.
International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a
welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income
(net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an
integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination.
Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment.
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1 Introduction
Location has become a key issue in the political debate on the macroeconomic conse-
quences of the recent wave of globalization. In the past, production of manufacturing
goods was to a large extent integrated within a single Þrm so that changing location was
an exceptional phenomenon. It meant that a wide range of diﬀerent production stages
had to be shifted from one place to another. Technical progress in recent years has dra-
matically changed the production process. Increased fragmentability and lower costs for
service links make production and assembling of diﬀerent parts of the value added chain
at diﬀerent locations feasible and proÞtable (see Jones, 2000; and Jones and Kierzkowski,
2001). Therefore, modern industrial production is characterized by a high and increasing
degree of vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing.1 The optimal location
is chosen for individual production stages, and specialized input producers make use of
competitive location advantages all over the world. These changes in Þrm location are
usually associated with international capital ßows.
Indeed, it is a salient feature of empirical evidence that at the same time capital mobil-
ity, Þrm mobility and the volume of intermediate goods trade have increased substantially.
However, an integrated approach for analyzing these phenomena is so far missing in the
literature. To close this gap is the purpose of our paper. It provides a simultaneous
explanation of the location of input producers, the volume of international outsourcing
(in the form of intermediate input trade) and the returns to immobile production factors
in a model with international capital mobility. Explanatory variables are the economic
fundamentals and national public infrastructure provision which is used for the purpose
1Hummels et al. (2001) Þnd for a sample of 14 economies (10 OECD members and four emerging
markets countries) that the share of exports due to vertical specialization (i.e., international outsourcing)
in total exports grew by about 30% over the period of 1970-1990 and that growth in vertical specialization
accounted for 30% of the growth in the overall export/GDP ratio. Egger and Egger (2003) provide
evidence on the development of outsourcing to Eastern economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
See also Feenstra (1998) and Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a discussion on the relvance of vertical
fragmentation and international outsourcing in modern industrial production.
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of competitive location policy.2 Firm subsidies are another instrument of competitive
location policy that is considered.
Our model emphasizes the importance of public infrastructure investment for a coun-
trys attractiveness as a location for intermediate input production. There is broad consen-
sus among economists and politicians that public infrastructure for Þrms is an important
aspect of competitive location policy. EU members, for example, agreed upon a bench-
mark method to determine the competitiveness of the EU economies. Among 54 indicators
that are used for the assessment, provision of infrastructure plays a prominent role (see
Brakman et al., 2002). And the Portland Development Commission (2002) states that
"an important role of government is to increase economic capacity by improving quality
and eﬃciency of public infrastructure and utilities necessary to business operation" (p.
7). In the context of vertical fragmentation, governments can use public infrastructure
provision as a policy instrument to attract a higher number of intermediate input pro-
ducers and therefore to reduce the volume of a countrys component imports from abroad
and to increase its attractiveness as a target for foreign outsourcing.3
International outsourcing involves three types of decisions: (i) integrated vs. frag-
mented production (technological separation), (ii) in-house production vs. outsourcing
(organizational separation) and (iii) national vs. international outsourcing (locational
separation). In this paper, we focus on the locational aspect, taking decisions (i) and (ii)
as given. We set up a general equilibrium model with one Þnal good and diﬀerentiated
intermediate inputs. Production in the Þnal goods sector employs internationally immo-
bile labor for assembling the outsourced (diﬀerentiated) intermediate inputs, which are
supplied under monopolistic competition. The intermediate inputs can be imported from
foreign suppliers (international outsourcing) or be purchased at home (national outsourc-
2A competitive location policy is a comprehensive policy ... that includes all aspects that deÞne the
attractiveness of a location. (Brakman et al., 2002, p. 2; in translation of Dutch Ministry of Economic
Aﬀairs, 1999, p. 114 f.)
3There is indeed strong empirical evidence that infrastructure matters for international outsourcing
activities. For instance, Egger and Egger (2005) Þnd that infrastructure quality in the target countries
explains about 30-40 percent of EU outward processing trade.
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ing). Intermediate input production makes use of internationally mobile capital. Final
goods markets as well as factor markets are competitive.
We assume that two small industrialized economies characterized by identical produc-
tion technologies form a free trade agreement (FTA). Endowments consist of immobile
labor and mobile capital that is owned by residents of the respective country. Intermedi-
ate input suppliers can decide about their location within the FTA, thereby taking into
account the attractiveness of the two FTA member countries for intermediate input pro-
duction. The idea that Þrms are located at some place implies that there are Þxed costs
which are incurred at a certain location and not at another (making imperfect competition
in the intermediate goods market a key aspect of our analysis). Hence, the attractiveness
of a country depends on the Þxed costs requirements for setting up a Þrm. Governments
can inßuence the location choice of input suppliers through national infrastructure policy.
A higher level of public infrastructure reduces the Þxed cost of setting up a Þrm in this
economy and therefore raises the attractiveness of a country. (See for a similar assumption
Bougheas et al., 2000; and Justman et al., 2001.)4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and shows how
our analysis contributes. After introducing the basic framework in Section 3 and solving
the FTA-equilibrium in Section 4, Section 5 provides the comparative-static analysis of
the eﬀects of public infrastructure investment on Þrm location, international outsourcing
and wages (i.e., the factor return to immobile labor). In Section 6 we analyze the role
of public infrastructure investment as a competitive location policy instrument that is
Þnanced by lump-sum taxes. In addition, we investigate the role of policy coordination by
comparing the non-cooperative policy equilibrium with optimal infrastructure provision
from an integrated point of view. In Section 7 we discuss the eﬀects of infrastructure
4Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) allow public infrastructure investment to aﬀect either variable or
Þxed costs of production. In their approach, the two types of infrastructure investment may have quite
diﬀerent implications in terms of output and the number of producers. The robustness of our results
is discussed in Subsection 7.1. We Þnd that the basic mechanisms remain valid if public infrastructure
reduces variable production costs rather than Þxed costs.
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investment that reduces variable production costs and analyze subsidies as an instrument
of competitive location policy. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
Due to our focus on the international location of input suppliers, our analysis is closely
related to the traditional trade literature dealing with international outsourcing as inter-
mediate goods trade. (See for instance Arndt, 1997; Deardorﬀ, 2001; Jones, 2000; Jones
and Kierzkowski, 2001; and Kohler, 2003.) However, there are important diﬀerences.
Models in the vein of the traditional trade literature make the assumption of perfect com-
petition at Þnal as well as intermediate goods markets and do not account for the role of
Þrms and their location decisions. In our model we account for Þrm location by assuming
that set-up costs have to be incurred in the country of production. This implies imperfect
competition. A crucial mechanism in our analysis is the interaction between the location
of intermediate goods producers and the attraction of internationally mobile capital. The
relationship between capital mobility and international outsourcing has Þrst been ana-
lyzed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996). They assume that capital movements are triggered
by scarcity of this factor in a certain economy and analyze the impact of capital ßows
on the location of input production. However, they do not account for the role of public
infrastructure investment as an instrument of competitive location policy. In our analysis,
national capital supply plays no role since capital is traded at an exogenous world interest
rate. Capital ßows are triggered by diﬀerences in public infrastructure investment (or
subsidies) which make a country attractive for Þrm entry.
Specifying Þrms explicitly is less important in a world without scale economies. But,
if external economies of scale and agglomeration eﬀects are important, the number of
producers at a certain location is crucial for the performance of countries. In this respect,
our model is closely related to the new economic geography literature that highlights the
relationship between Þrm location and factor mobility to explain a core-periphery pat-
tern in (international) goods production (see for instance Krugman, 1991). However,
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the focus of those models lies on Þnal goods production, whereas outsourcing of inter-
mediate component production is typically not considered.5 In contrast, we assume that
external scale economies arise at the intermediate goods level and that agglomeration
rents are totally absorbed by immobile factors. The latter is motivated by our focus on
small open economies and a competitive market for internationally mobile capital. As a
consequence, agglomeration eﬀects are weaker in our framework than in the above men-
tioned Krugman-type models and do not result in full divergence in the sense that all
sophisticated (intermediate goods) production stays in the core and only labor-intensive
Þnal assembly survives in the periphery. Rather, we speak of a core (periphery) country
if it hosts more (less) intermediate goods producers than its partner in the free trade
agreement, resulting in higher (lower) marginal productivity of immobile labor.
More recently, agglomeration eﬀects have also been addressed in the tax competition
literature. See Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Kind et al. (2000) and Ludema andWooton
(2000). These papers emphasize that governments can tax mobile factors if they earn
rents due to their location in the core. Bucovetsky (2004) analyzes locational competition
through public input provision in a multi-region framework with external economies of
scale. In that paper, national provision of public inputs is put forward as an explanation
for core-periphery patterns in industrial production. Furthermore, it is shown that over-
or underprovision of the public input may arise, depending on the particular objective
function of governments. However, Bucovetskys model is not in the tradition of the new
economic geography literature since it neglects the role of transport costs. Moreover, he
considers perfect competition so that it is the amount of the mobile factor employed at a
certain location and not the number of Þrms that determines total income.
Martin and Rogers (1995) investigate the role of public expenditures on national and
international transport costs for Þrm location in a new economic geography framework.6
5For an exception see Krugman and Venables (1995) who allow for Þnal as well as intermediate goods
trade. See also Baldwin et al. (2003, chapter 8) for a discussion on vertical linkages (i.e. input and
output relationships among Þrms) in models of the new economic geography.
6The authors distinguish between national and international transport costs to give insights on how
regional aid policy should be shaped, when fostering industrial convergence is at the agenda of policy-
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In this respect, their analysis is closely related to the topic of our study. However, there
are important diﬀerences. First, while Martin and Rogers study the location of Þnal
goods producers, we deal with the location of intermediate input producers and analyze
the impact of infratructure investment on the outsourcing pattern. Second, we focus
on public attempts of reducing Þxed set up costs of Þrms. This allows us to discuss
besides the role of public infrastructure also the eﬀects of subsidies as an instrument of
competitive location policy. Third, we investigate non-cooperative policy decisions and
provide insights into the gains of international coordination.7
For completeness, it is worth noting that our model includes some aspects which are
also addressed in the literature on multinational Þrms, like location decisions for produc-
tion plants (see for instance Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Venables, 2000). However,
that literature focuses on intra-Þrm rather than arms length transactions. Moreover,
in the theory of multinational Þrms both the decision on setting up a production plant
abroad and the decision on intra-Þrm trade are simultaneously made by a multinationals
headquarters. This is diﬀerent in our model of international outsourcing, where the input
suppliers decide on whether to set up intermediate goods production at a certain location
and the Þnal goods producers decide on the volume of international outsourcing. Recently,
several studies have analyzed a multinationals decision to enter a foreign market through
direct investment and subsidiary production or through international outsourcing and
arms length transaction. (See e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2003, 2004; and Markusen,
2002.) Such a decision problem is not considered in our paper. We focus on market
transactions. Bilateral relations based on contractual arrangements are not considered.
makers. They conclude that poor countries should prefer infrastructure projects that reduce national
transport costs, to avoid relocation provoked by lower international transport costs.
7Bougheas et al. (2003) analyze the eﬀciency of uncoordinated investment in infrastructure which
reduces variable transportation costs. Their results point to the possibility of overinvestment in the public
provision of national and international transport facilities. Further contributions to public infrastructure
spending in settings of the new economic geography include Bougheas et al. (1999, 2000) and Justman
et al. (2002). However, as noted by Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 421): Relatively few papers to date address
issues of tax and tax competition in an economic geography framework.
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The contribution of our paper can be summarized in the following way: First, our fo-
cus is on the location of input producers. This allows us to investigate the nexus between
factor mobility, outsourcing and Þrm location, when governments can invest in infrastruc-
ture to improve the attractiveness of a country as a location for industrial production.
Second, we rigorously investigate possible Nash equilibria of strategic infrastructure provi-
sion in a 2-country setting and compare the results with the outcome under coordination.
Thereby, the existence of transport costs plays a key role for the basic incentive of strate-
gic infrastructure provision. However, transport costs are exogenous in our analysis. We
focus on infrastructure provision which reduces Þxed costs for setting up Þrms. This
procedure not only allows us to solve the model analytically (thereby avoiding reliance
on numerical simulation exercises) but also makes a comparison between infrastructure
provision (a pure public good) and subsidies (characterized by perfect rivalry) possible.
3 Theoretical Framework
We consider economies with a single Þnal good Y (the numéraire good) and two primary
production factors: internationally immobile labor L and internationally mobile K, which
may be interpreted as capital or know-how. Production of Þnal output makes use of dif-
ferentiated intermediate inputs xi and primary input L. The production of diﬀerentiated
intermediate inputs is outsourced by the Þnal goods producers and purchased through
arms length transactions from (anonymous) input suppliers at market prices. Labor re-
quirements L may be associated with business service activities that are essential in the
assembling process. The production technology for Þnal output Y is of a Cobb-Douglas
type and given by8
Y = XαL1−α, X =
³X
i
xρi
´1/ρ
, 0 < α < ρ < 1. (1)
8The assumption α < ρ guarantees that the marginal product of xi increases in the use of xj , j 6= i.
An immediate consequence of this assumption is that overall output Y is positively related to labor
endowment L. This can be seen by using (8), (A.15) and the deÞnition of Ak (given below (9)) in (1).
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Following Ethier (1982) we assume that the contribution of intermediate inputs xi can be
aggregated by a CES-index. For the production of diﬀerentiated inputs employment of K
is essential. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the production of diﬀerentiated
inputs does not require employment of factor L. The production technology in the X-
sector is identical for all Þrms and given by
xi = Ki. (2)
In addition, setting up an input production facility has Þxed costs. They are incurred
by investing f units of Þnal output. We follow the common approach that monopolistic
competition characterizes the market for the diﬀerentiated intermediate inputs xi. Free
entry of input producers leads to average cost pricing, so that revenues equal total costs
in equilibrium.
4 Equilibrium under a Free Trade Agreement
Let H and F be two industrialized economies characterized by identical production tech-
nologies and endowments L
H
and L
F
of the immobile factor, respectively. The two
economies form a free trade agreement (FTA) so that there are no tariﬀ barriers on
intermediate input and Þnal goods trade between H and F . In addition, we assume that
commodity Y is freely traded between the FTA and the rest of the world (RoW), whereas
there is no trade of intermediate goods outside the FTA.9 Finally, we assume that both
countries H and F are small economies. Figure 1 summarizes the structure of our model.
>Figure 1<
9There are several reasons why intermediate inputs cannot be traded between the FTA and the RoW.
First, trading costs between the FTA and the RoW may be prohibitive for sophisticated intermediate
inputs. Second, there may be a complex set of rules of origin, which prohibits use of intermediate inputs
from outside the world. For a discussion on the negative eﬀects of rules of origins in the presence of
a FTA see Baldwin (2001) and Lloyd (2001). Finally, the RoW may employ an integrated production
technology for commodity Y , so that there is neither supply of nor demand for sophisticated intermediate
inputs in the RoW. In any case, the production structure in the RoW is not explicitly speciÞed.
9
The small country assumption paired with perfect mobility of factor K implies that
its factor return, r, is determined in the world market outside the FTA. This renders
country-speciÞc endowments with capital irrelevant for the subsequent analysis. The
price, wk, for the immobile factor depends on its location k = H,F . It is determined by
the condition that labor earns its marginal product and full-employment Lk = L
k
prevails
in equilibrium. Thus, according to (1)
(1− α)Y k
L
k
= wk, (3)
where Y k is the equilibrium level of Þnal output in country k = H,F . Denote by
pkH,i (p
k
F,j) the (trade costs including) prices of the intermediate component x
k
H,i (x
k
F,j)
produced by input supplier i (j) located in country H (F , respectively) and used by a
Þnal goods producer located in country k = H,F . The free trade agreement allows the
Þrms in the Þnal goods sector to choose freely between intermediate inputs regardless of
their origin. Demand of xkH,i (x
k
F,j) is determined by the proÞt maximization problem of
the representative Þrm max
xkH,i, x
k
F,j
Y k −
hP
i p
k
H,ix
k
H,i +
P
j p
k
F,jx
k
F,j
i
, which gives:
αY k
Xk
Ã
Xk
xkH,i
!1−ρ
= pkH,i, i = 1, ..., nH ; k = H,F , (4a)
αY k
Xk
Ã
Xk
xkF,j
!1−ρ
= pkF,j, j = 1, ...., nF ; k = H,F , (4b)
where Xk :=
hPnH
i=1
¡
xkH,i
¢ρ
+
PnF
j=1
¡
xkF,j
¢ρi1/ρ
. The number of input producers, nH , nF ,
will be endogenously determined by the entry/exit decisions of Þrms.
Using (4a), (4b) and deÞning aggregate price index P kX :=
PnH
i=1
¡
pkH,i
¢1−σ
+
PnF
j=1
¡
pkF,j
¢1−σ
,
σ = 1/ (1− ρ), we Þnd that10 pkH,i =
³
αY k
PkX
´1−ρ ¡
xkH,i
¢−(1−ρ)
and pkF,j =
³
αY k
PkX
´1−ρ ¡
xkF,j
¢−(1−ρ)
,
k = H,F , are the demand functions relevant for an xi-producer located in country H and
an xj-producer located in country F , respectively. This gives us for the maximization
10Use (4a), (4b) and the deÞnition of Xk to see that
PnH
i=1 p
k
H,ix
k
H,i+
PnF
j=1 p
k
F,jx
k
F,j = αY
k. Moreover,
solve (4a) and (4b) for xkH,i and x
k
F,j , respectively. Show then that P
k
X =
¡
αY k/Xk
¢1−σ
.
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problem of an xi-producer located in country H:
max
xHH,i , x
F
H,i
¡
xHH,i
¢ρ
DH +
¡
xFH,i
¢ρ
DF − r
¡
xHH,i + x
F
H,i
¢− t xFH,i − fH , (5)
where Dk :=
³
αY k
PkX
´1−ρ
, k = H,F , is exogenous to the single producer. Note that,
according to (2), marginal production costs of intermediate goods are equal to factor price
r of internationally mobile K which is determined in the world market. t > 0 are unit
trade costs for international x-transactions, identical for both economies. Setting up an
input production facility in country k, requires investment of fk units of Þnal output.
The country-speciÞc Þxed costs fk depend on the countrys infrastructure and reßect the
attractiveness of a location for intermediate goods production and thus employment of
K. The maximization problem of an xj-producer located in country F is:
max
xHF,j , x
F
F,j
¡
xHF,j
¢ρ
DH +
¡
xFF,j
¢ρ
DF − r
¡
xHF,j + x
F
F,j
¢− t xHF,j − fF . (6)
Within each country intermediate input producers are symmetric. Solving (5) and
(6) we obtain a system of four Þrst-order conditions for intermediate goods producers.
Together with (1), the two zero proÞt conditions of intermediate input producers and the
six conditions in (3) and (4), describing the Þnal goods sector in countries H and F, we
have fourteen equations. (Note that (1) applies to both Y H and Y F .) They determine
the endogenous variables xkH , x
k
F , p
k
H , p
k
F , nk, w
k and Y k, k = H,F , as functions of the
fundamentals of the two economies. In particular, the outcome depends on Þxed costs fk
which are aﬀected by public infrastructure policy. This will allow us to do comparative-
static analysis of policy eﬀects (see Section 5). Equilibrium prices, quantities and numbers
of intermediate input producers implied by (1) and (4)-(6) are given by the following
expressions:
pkk =
r
ρ
and pk
0
k =
r + t
ρ
, (7)
xkk0 = x
k
k
µ
r
r + t
¶σ
and xkk =
h
fk − fk0
¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1i
φ
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1) , (8)
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nk =
Ak
·¡
1/xkk
¢B − ¡ r
r+t
¢σ−1 ³
L
k0
/L
k
´B ¡
1/xk
0
k0
¢B¸
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1) , (9)
with k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}. Thereby, φ := ρ
(1−ρ)r , A
k :=
¡
αρ
r
¢ B
1−α
³
L
k
´B
and B := ρ(1−α)
ρ−α > 1
are constants depending on r, L
k
and technology parameters.
In an Ethier-type model with constant elasticity of substitution between varieties,
Þrms set prices according to a constant markup rule. Since labor is not employed in the
production of intermediate goods and the factor return to capital is determined in the
world market outside the FTA, input prices are exogenous, according to (7). In addition,
the same production technologies are used in the two economies. Hence, input prices are
symmetric: pHH = p
F
F and p
F
H = p
H
F . However, transport costs imply that export prices
are higher than prices for domestic sales, i.e. pk
0
k > p
k
k. This gives rise to a home bias
with respect to the use of intermediate inputs in Þnal goods production. The output
level sold to the foreign market is proportional to the level of local sales of a foreign
producer, according to (8). The ratio xkk0/x
k
k depends on the price diﬀerential p
k
k/p
k
k0 and
is constant (since both r and t are exogenous). The level of sales is determined by the
zero proÞt condition. Firm size and output pattern (xkk, x
k0
k ) must be consistent with the
condition that revenues equal total costs. Hence, according to (8), equilibrium output
per Þrm depends on the parameters characterizing the demand behavior of Þnal goods
producers and on the parameters representing the variable and Þxed cost components in
intermediate input production. The number of viable Þrms depends in addition on the
market size parameters L
k
and L
k0
. A higher L
k
renders country k a more attractive
location for input production, since it increases local demand there. As a consequence,
other things equal, nk increases and nk0 declines if L
k
rises.
Finally, according to (1), a rise in the number of input producers has a positive eﬀect
on labor productivity in the Þnal goods sector. Thus, any policy that promotes Þrm
entry in the intermediate goods sector positively feeds back on Þnal output and wages.
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Combining equations (7)-(9) with (1) and (3), we get for the equilibrium wage
wk =
Ck
¡
1/xkk
¢ !B
L
k
, (10)
with Ck := (1− α)
³
L
k
´1−α ¡
Ak
¢α/ρ
and eB := α³B
ρ
− 1
´
. Changes in the Þxed costs
by public infrastructure investment aﬀect the number of input producers simultaneously
with their size. Lower Þxed costs allow smaller and more Þrms to enter proÞtably. This
is good for labor productivity and wages. The following section discusses the role of
infrastructure policy for Þrm location, international outsourcing and wages in detail. For
a formal derivation of (7)-(10) see Appendix A.1.
The FTA-equilibrium was derived under the assumption of interior solutions (i.e.,
nk > 0, xkH > 0, x
k
F > 0, k = H,F ). According to (8) and (9), the following conditions
are necessary and suﬃcient for an interior solution
t > r ·max
"µ
fF
fH
¶ 1
σ−1
− 1,
µ
fH
fF
¶ 1
σ−1
− 1
#
(11)
and
1 >
µ
r
r + t
¶σ−1
·max
ÃLF
L
H
xHH
xFF
!B
,
Ã
L
H
L
F
xFF
xHH
!B . (12)
Roughly spoken, the two conditions are fulÞlled if Þxed costs fH , fF and immobile factor
endowments L
H
, L
F
are not too diﬀerent. In the symmetric case, i.e. if fH = fF and
L
H
= L
F
, both conditions (11) and (12) are satisÞed for any t > 0.
5 Public Infrastructure Expenditures, Firm Location,
International Outsourcing and Wages
In this section we provide a positive analysis on how public infrastructure expenditures
aﬀect the location of input producers, the amount of international outsourcing and wages
in the two economies. As mentioned in the introduction we follow Bougheas et al. (2000)
and assume that public infrastructure only has an impact on Þxed costs fk. An increase
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of public infrastructure investment in country H reduces Þxed costs fH and therefore
increases the attractiveness of country H as a location of intermediate input production.
Fixed costs in country F are not aﬀected.11 Of course, there is an indirect eﬀect of
infrastructure expenditures on the marginal productivity of immobile labor, due to a
change in number, size and location of input suppliers. This results in wage adjustments
in the two economies, as will be explained in detail below.
We assume that there are two types of Þxed costs: (i) Þxed costs fPk that are re-
duced/replaced by public infrastructure investment and (ii) Þrm-speciÞc Þxed costs f 0k
that are independent of public infrastructure investment.12 Examples for the Þrst type
of Þxed costs are connection facilities to outside world (e.g., internet). An example for
the second type would be establishment of the intra-Þrm information and communica-
tion system. Formally, public infrastructure investment and Þxed costs are related in the
following way:
fk (Gk) =
 f 0k + fPk (Gk)f 0k
if
if
Gk ∈
£
0, Gk
£
Gk ≥ Gk
, k = H,F. (13)
Gk represents the level of public infrastructure investment. fPk (Gk) is a negatively
sloped function in interval Gk ∈
£
0, Gk
£
, with fPk (0) > 0 and f
P
k
¡
Gk
¢
= 0. The beneÞt
from investment into public infrastructure reaches a maximum at Gk = Gk. Public
investment above this level cannot increase the attractiveness of a country for intermediate
input production, since Þrm-speciÞc Þxed costs f0k > 0 are independent of the level of
public infrastructure provision. It is assumed that f 0k and f
P
k are restricted in such a
way that (11) and (12) are satisÞed for all possible combinations of Gk ∈
£
0, Gk
¤
and
Gk0 ∈
£
0, Gk0
¤
and interior solutions result with positive supply of intermediate inputs in
both economies.
In the following comparative-static analysis, we consider variations of infrastructure
11Small spillover eﬀects would not destroy our results.
12In contrast to a pure subsidy for founding a new Þrm, infrastructure investment has a public good
character. For a discussion on the robustness of our Þndings with respect to this assumption see Section
7.2.
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parameterG in countryH and hold Þxed costs in country F at fF constant.13 Proposition
1 summarizes the eﬀects of public infrastructure investment on number and location of
intermediate input suppliers.
Proposition 1 A GH-induced decline of Þxed costs fH has a positive eﬀect on the number
of input suppliers in country H and a negative eﬀect in country F . The impact on the
total number of input suppliers (in H plus F ) is ambiguous. fH (GH) ≤ fF guarantees a
positive impact.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For any given GH ∈
£
0, GH
£
, an increase in infrastructure provision GH implies that
Þxed costs decline in country H so that H becomes a more attractive location for inter-
mediate input production. This has two eﬀects. First, the GH-induced decline of Þxed
costs in country H leads ceteris paribus to entry of additional Þrms and therefore to a rise
in the number of input suppliers located in country H. Second, for constant Þxed costs
in country F , there is exit of input producers in country F , due to higher competition
with country H Þrms. The eﬀect on the overall number of intermediate input producers
is positive if Þxed costs in country H are not higher than in country F , but is ambigu-
ous in general. If fH (GH) > fF the negative "exit" eﬀect in low-Þxed cost country F
may dominate the positive "new entry" eﬀect in high-Þxed cost country H so that the
total number of intermediate input producers may decline in response to a GH-induced
reduction of Þxed costs fH .
Next we consider the impact of public infrastructure investment on international out-
sourcing from the two economies. We are interested in both the volume of international
outsourcing, i.e. nk0xkk0, k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}, as well as the international outsourcing in-
tensity ξk :=
nk0xkk0
nkx
k
k
, which is a measure for country ks exposure to intermediate goods
13The comparative-static analysis is made under the assumption that public infrastructure investments
are Þnanced by lump-sum taxes, which do not have feedback eﬀects. See Section 6 for the budget constraint
of the government.
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imports.14 The impacts of public infrastructure investment on international outsourcing
are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 A GH-induced decline of Þxed costs fH leads to a decline in the volume
of country Hs international outsourcing, i.e., a reduction of nFxHF , and an increase in
the volume of country F s international outsourcing, i.e., an increase of nHxFH . The
international outsourcing intensity decreases in country H and increases in country F .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
For any given GH ∈
£
0, GH
£
, a higher level of public infrastructure in country H
induces at the same time a rise in the number nH of intermediate good varieties produced
in country H and a decline in the number nF of varieties produced in F (see Proposition
1). In addition, there is an output eﬀect. Lower Þxed costs in country H make Þrm
entry easier. Thus, more locally produced varieties compete for use by the Þnal goods
producers. This drives down demand per intermediate component in country H, i.e.,
xHH and x
H
F decline. In sum, intermediate goods imports of country H, i.e., nFx
H
F , are
reduced. The opposite happens in country F , where the decline in the number of locally
produced varieties leads to higher demand per intermediate input, i.e., both xFF and x
F
H
increase, so that country F s international outsourcing nHxFH is stimulated.
To understand the impact of GH on international outsourcing intensity ξH =
nF x
H
F
nHx
H
H
,
recall that the ratio of xHF to x
H
H is constant, according to (8), since relative input prices
are Þxed by t and r. Hence ξH simpliÞes to ξH =
nF
nH
¡
r
r+t
¢σ
, which, for any given
GH ∈
£
0, GH
£
, unambiguously declines in the level of public infrastructure in country
H, according to Proposition 1. Some foreign intermediate input suppliers are replaced by
14In the literature, international outsourcing intensity is often measured as intermediate goods imports
relative to gross production. However, a change in this measure comprises several eﬀects, namely, (i)
a change in the resource requirements per output, (ii) changes in overall (national and international)
outsourcing for given resource requirements per output, maybe due to technological changes in the Þnal
goods production, and (iii) variations in international relative to national outsourcing. Since we are
interested in the foreign impact only, we think that ξk =
n
k
0
nk
xk
k0
xkk
is the better measure.
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local producers in countryH. The opposite Þnding holds for the international outsourcing
intensity ξF .
Finally, policymakers are interested in the eﬀects of infrastructure provision on wages.
(Note that the earnings of capital owners are determined in the world market.) At this
stage of our analysis we focus on gross wages. The tax burden of public infrastructure
investment is taken into account in Section 6.
According to (1) and (3), marginal productivity of L and thus the wage rate is a
function of the CES-aggregator X of intermediate components. As a consequence, wages
critically depend on how many input suppliers are located in H and F , respectively, and
on the volume of intermediate inputs purchased from Þrms at the two locations. The
following proposition summarizes the wage eﬀects resulting when public infrastructure
policy changes the attractiveness of location H.
Proposition 3 A GH-induced decline of Þxed costs fH leads to higher wages in country
H and lower wages in country F .
Proof. Proposition 3 follows from (8), (10) and (13).
A decline of Þxed costs fH raises the number of input producers located in country
H and reduces the number of input producers located in country F (see Proposition
1). These Þrm number adjustments exhibit opposing eﬀects on CES-index XH and, by
virtue of (1) and (3), also on wH . If all inputs were used to the same extent, the total
eﬀect would be ambiguous since the eﬀect on nH + nF is ambiguous. However, we have
a home bias. According to (8), inputs coming from domestic suppliers have a higher
weight in Þnal goods production. Therefore, the positive eﬀect on XH of the increased
number of suppliers located in H dominates the negative eﬀect of a decreased number of
suppliers from F . In sum, labor productivity and thus wH unambiguously rise, when GH
is increased (as long as GH ∈
£
0, GH
£
). The opposite eﬀect is triggered in country F .
In sum, we Þnd that public infrastructure investment by increasing the attractiveness
of a country as a location for intermediate input production reduces international out-
sourcing of that country and has a positive impact on wages. At the same time, the public
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infrastructure investments have negative eﬀects on the partner country. The number of
input producers located in country F declines. This is accompanied by an increase in
outsourcing from F to H and leads to lower wages in F .15
In Section 6 we extend the positive analysis presented in this section and investigate
the role of public infrastructure expenditures as a policy strategy. Thereby, we assume
that total income of residents, net of the tax burden of public infrastructure investment,
is the objective of the government.
6 Public Infrastructure Investment as Competitive
Location Policy
By providing a certain level of infrastructure for Þrms governments can inßuence the
attractiveness of their country as a location for suppliers of intermediate inputs, the
production of which is outsourced by the producers of Þnal output. This aﬀects the
macroeconomic equilibrium, in particular the wage earned by immobile labor. Thus, the
choice of Gk is a policy instrument for increasing the citizens welfare.16 Welfare is given
by national income net of tax payments for public infrastructure Þnance, i.e. by
W k = wkL
k
+ rK
k − T k, k = H,F. (14)
T k denotes lump-sum taxes which are used for Þnancing public infrastructure investment
Gk in country k and rK
k
is capital income of residents of country k. Since L
k
, K
k
and r
15Our framework also allows us to study the relationship between capital ßows and the factor return to
immobile labor. Since capital is used for producing xk, capital ßows mirror the outsourcing streams. Like
in Feenstra and Hanson (1996), we can show that the country which experiences a capital inßow gains
relative to the other economy, which suﬀers from capital outßow. However, in our model the capital
ßows are triggered by national infrastructure investment, an issue which is not addressed in Feenstra
and Hanson (1996). For further details on how public infrastructure provision aﬀects cross-country wage
diﬀerentials, see Egger and Falkinger (2003).
16It is important to keep in mind that Gk represents only infrastructure for Þrms. Public infrastructure
for households has of course diﬀerent eﬀects.
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are exogenously given, welfare can only be inßuenced if wages wk and/or lump-sum taxes
vary. Both wk and T k depend on the chosen level Gk of public infrastructure for Þrms.
It is assumed that providing level Gk costs µkGk units of Þnal output,where µk ≥ 0 is a
constant. The higher µk, the more costly it is to provide Gk. Since Y is the numéraire
good,
T k = µkGk, k = H,F , (15)
gives the tax burden imposed by public infrastructure provision Gk in country k.
It is clear that the optimal infrastructure choice critically depends on the functional
speciÞcation of fPk (·). For the sake of simplicity we assume that fPk (·) is a linear function
in interval
£
0, Gk
¤
, given by fPk (Gk) = Gk −Gk, k = H,F .
6.1 The Optimal Level of Public Infrastructure Investment
According to Proposition 3, wage wk is an increasing function of public infrastructure level
Gk. Let for a given level Gk0 in the partner country W k0 (Gk, Gk0) := w
kL
k
+ rK
k
, be the
possible levels of gross national income in k. Straightforward calculations show that, under
the linear speciÞcation of fPk (Gk),W
k
0 is an increasing and strictly convex function ofGk in
interval
£
0, Gk
£
.17 Moreover, T k is linear inGk. Since ∂2W k0 /∂G
2
k > 0, if ∂W
k
0 /∂Gk ≤ µk it
is beneÞcial to decrease Gk as long as this is possible, i.e. until Gk = 0. If ∂W k0 /∂Gk ≥ µk
it is beneÞcial to increase infrastructure provision until Gk = Gk is reached. Increasing Gk
beyond18 Gk cannot further reduce Þxed costs, rendering gross incomeW k0 independent of
Gk for infrastructure levels above Gk. However, welfare W k (Gk, Gk0) declines due to the
additional tax burden induced by higher public infrastructure expenditures. In Figure 2
welfare functionWH (GH , GF ) = WH0 (GH , GF )−µHGH is drawn for a given GF and two
diﬀerent cost coeﬃcients µ1H > µ
2
H of public infrastructure provision.
>Figure 2<
17The convexity of Wk0 is preserved, as long as the shape of f
P
k (Gk) is not too convex. For a formal
discussion on this issue, see Egger and Falkinger (2003).
18The remaining Þxed costs are Þrm-speciÞc, recall (13).
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The dotted line µ1HGH indicates a situation with low productivity in public infrastruc-
ture provision. In this case, the welfare maximizing GH-decision (for a given level of
public infrastructure in country F ) is given by GH = 0 as can be seen from the dotted
welfare function WH (GH , GF ) for µ1H . (At GH = 0, we have ∂W
H
0 /∂GH < µH . At the
point where µH is tangential to W
H
0 a welfare minimum would be reached.) In contrast,
if productivity in infrastructure provision is high, i.e. if µH is low, the welfare maximizing
GH-decision is given by GH = GH . This case is represented by the solid line µ2HGH and
solid welfare functionWH (GH , GF ) for µ2H . (AtGH = GH , we have ∂W
H
0 /∂GH > µH , but
a further reduction of Þxed costs by increasing infrastructure investments is not feasible,
according to (13).)
For any given level of public infrastructure quality Gk0 in the partner country there
is a threshold µk (Gk0) of the cost of infrastructure provision at which the government in
country k is indiﬀerent between choosing Gk = 0 or Gk = Gk. This cost threshold is
given by the condition W k (0, Gk0) = W k
¡
Gk, Gk0
¢
which is equivalent to W k0 (0, Gk0) =
W k0
¡
Gk, Gk0
¢− µkGk. Thus,
µk (Gk0) :=
wk
¡
Gk, Gk0
¢− wk (0, Gk0)
Gk
L
k
, (16)
where wk (Gk, Gk0) denotes the equilibrium wage in country k when the infrastructure level
is Gk in country k and Gk0 in country k0. Obviously, for a given level Gk0 in the partner
country k0, the optimal choice for country k is Gk = Gk if µk < µk (Gk0) and Gk = 0 if
µk > µk (Gk0), respectively. The infrastructure level Gk0 in the partner country aﬀects w
k,
according to our analysis in Section 5, and thus µk (Gk0), according to (16). Combining
these facts, we obtain the following results concerning the optimal infrastructure policy
of country k in response to a given infrastructure policy of partner country k0.19
Proposition 4 Let k, k0 ∈ {H,F}, k 6= k0. µk (Gk0) is decreasing in Gk0 and: (i) if
µk ≤ µk
¡
Gk0
¢
, then Gk = Gk is a dominant strategy; (ii) if µk ≥ µk (0), then Gk = 0 is a
dominant strategy; (iii) if µk ∈
¤
µk
¡
Gk0
¢
, µk (0)
£
, then Gk = 0 is the optimal response to
Gk0 = Gk0 and Gk = Gk is the optimal response to Gk0 = 0.
19Equilibria in mixed strategies are not considered.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The economic interpretation of Proposition 4 is as follows. If a countrys productivity
in producing public infrastructure is high so that infrastructure can be improved at rela-
tively low cost, then the country should decide for top infrastructure provision, regardless
of the situation in the partner country. In contrast, for a country with relatively high cost
of infrastructure provision competitive location policy in form of infrastructure investment
would be counterproductive from a welfare point of view. However, in intermediate cases
- with a less extreme cost structure - optimal policy depends on the other countrys po-
sition. More precisely, for countries with intermediate costs of infrastructure our analysis
suggests not to imitate the partner country. Top infrastructure provision only pays if the
other country has a low infrastructure level.
These results are of particular interest in the context of the discussion about core and
periphery economies. They show that public infrastructure investments can explain core-
periphery patterns as politico-economic equilibria - with the core country being character-
ized by high infrastructure investment, a large number of intermediate input producers,
low international outsourcing and high productivity of labor (and therefore high wages),
whereas the opposite holds true in the periphery country characterized by low taxes and
a low level of public infrastructure. While part (i) and part (ii) of Proposition 4 indicate
that the diﬀerentiation into core and periphery is determined by diﬀerences in the costs
of public infrastructure provision µk, part (iii) of the proposition points out that a dif-
ferentiation into core and periphery also can result without such diﬀerences. Even in the
case of ex ante perfectly symmetric economies, countries may ex post be diﬀerent with
respect to the optimally chosen level of public infrastructure provision Gk.20
20This result conÞrms the insights by Bucovetsky (2004). However, in line with the new economic
geography literature, the existence of transport costs and the number of local producers is essential for
our results, while in Bucovetskys contribution transport costs are not considered and the number of Þrms
is unimportant, since there is perfect competition.
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6.2 Welfare in the FTA: Is There a Need for Policy Coordina-
tion?
From the analysis in Section 5 we know that an infrastructure-induced welfare gain in
country H reduces wages and thus welfare in country F (see Proposition 3). This nega-
tive eﬀect on welfare in country F is not considered by Hs government when choosing
the optimal level of public infrastructure investment. As a consequence uncoordinated
infrastructure policies may lead to suboptimal FTA-welfareWFTA
¡
:=WH +W F
¢
. Con-
sider the case of two symmetric countries. Then, national welfare net of taxes is given by
W k = wk (Gk, Gk0)L + rK − µGk ≡ W (Gk, Gk0). Thus, the pay-oﬀ matrix for the two
possible choices of optimal infrastructure policy Gk = 0 and Gk = G is of the form
GH = 0 GH = G
GF = 0 W (0, 0) ;W (0, 0) W
¡
0, G
¢
;W
¡
G, 0
¢
GF = G W
¡
G, 0
¢
;W
¡
0, G
¢
W
¡
G,G
¢
;W
¡
G,G
¢
According to Proposition 4, three cases must be distinguished:
If cost µ is relatively low GH = G and GF = G are dominant strategies, i.e.
W
¡
G, 0
¢
> W (0, 0) and W
¡
G,G
¢
> W
¡
0, G
¢
. (17)
Total welfare resulting in the non-cooperative equilibrium is thus
W FTA = 2W
¡
G,G
¢
. (18)
It is easy to check that (17) is consistent with21 W (0, 0) > W
¡
G,G
¢
so that total welfare
WH+WF could be increased toWFTA = 2W (0, 0) by cooperating at GH = GF = 0. This
does not mean that policy coordination at GH = GF = 0 necessarily increases welfare.
For instance, if µ is suﬃciently low, GH = GF = G is also optimal from the point of view
of FTA-welfare.22
21Note that Propositon 3 implies W
¡
G,G
¢
< W
¡
G, 0
¢
and W (0, 0) > W
¡
0, G
¢
.
22In the case of µk = 0, such an outcome is guaranteed. Costless public infrastructure investments are
unrealistic. But the case µk = 0 is interesting for the following reason. We can interpret an increase in G
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Under high infrastructure cost µ, we have (from part (ii) of Proposition 4)
W (0, 0) > W
¡
G, 0
¢
and W
¡
0, G
¢
> W
¡
G,G
¢
, (19)
and
W FTA = 2W (0, 0) (20)
in the non-cooperative equilibrium. SinceW
¡
0, G
¢
< W (0, 0) andW
¡
G,G
¢
< W
¡
G, 0
¢
,
according to Proposition 3 and the deÞnition ofW , the inequalities in (19) implyW
¡
G,G
¢
<
W (0, 0). Thus, in the case of a high µ policy coordination at GH = GF = G would deÞ-
nitely decrease welfare W FTA to 2W
¡
G,G
¢
< 2W (0, 0).
In the case of intermediate cost levels µ, we have
W
¡
G, 0
¢
> W (0, 0) and W
¡
0, G
¢
> W
¡
G,G
¢
, (21)
and
W FTA =W
¡
G, 0
¢
+W
¡
0, G
¢
(22)
in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The ranking described by (21) implies23 2W
¡
G,G
¢
<
W
¡
G, 0
¢
+W
¡
0, G
¢
but is consistent with24 2W (0, 0) ≶ W
¡
G, 0
¢
+W
¡
0, G
¢
. Thus,
coordination at GH = GF = G cannot improve WFTA but coordination at GH = GF = 0
may be beneÞcial.
Due to the positive external scale economies of the Ethier model, attracting Þrms
by providing public infrastructure for them has negative external eﬀects on the partner
country which loses Þrms. Hence, uncoordinated competitive policy may lead to over-
provision of public infrastructure for Þrms. This result diﬀers from the Þndings in the
public economics literature on infrastructure provision and capital mobility, discussed by
as improvements in the quality of economic order, which relates a countrys attractiveness for intermediate
input production to characteristics like property rights. A higher quality of economic order increases both
national and FTA-income. A more detailed discussion on this issue can be found in Egger and Falkinger
(2003).
23Proposition 3 implies W
¡
G,G
¢
< W
¡
G, 0
¢
. Moreover, according to (21), W
¡
G,G
¢
< W
¡
0, G
¢
.
24On the one hand we haveW (0, 0) < W
¡
G, 0
¢
due to (21), but on the other handW (0, 0) > W
¡
0, G
¢
,
according to Proposition 3.
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Sinn (2003). In that literature, positive scale economies (external to the individual Þrm)
are not considered so that the equilibrium under Þscal competition (between identical
economies) is eﬃcient.25
>Figure 3<
Figure 3 summarizes our results about the non-cooperative policy equilibria and the
possibilities to improve welfare by coordinating the provision of public infrastructure for
Þrms. Sometimes though not always policy coordination can improve overall welfare com-
pared to non-cooperative competitive location policy.26 In particular, an agreement to
refrain from top infrastructure provision may be beneÞcial. This does not mean that
coordination at zero public infrastructure is optimal. It is straightforward to show that
coordination at some positive level of public infrastructure provision (at least in one coun-
try) may be W FTA-maximizing. But then, as an immediate consequence of the convexity
of welfare function W , such welfare-maximizing coordination leads to a core-periphery
outcome (with Gk 6= Gk0 ≤ G) and not to harmonization in public infrastructure provi-
sion. Hence, WFTA-maximizing coordination may exhibit adverse distributional eﬀects,
if there are no supplementary measures to redistribute coordination gains.
This result is of particular relevance for the recent discussion on how to promote
national infrastructure projects in the enlarged EU25 area. In view of our results, the
optimal allocation of EU infrastructure expenditures does not necessarily lead to identical
infrastructure quality in all member countries. Rather, if distributional justice in the FTA
is at the agenda, it may be more eﬃcient to exploit agglomeration rents by allowing for
25However, the possibility of overprovision of public goods is not new in the literature of tax competition.
In the absence of external scale economies overprovision may be a problem if tax harmonization intensiÞes
infrastructure competition (see Sinn, 2003, p. 45). Moreover, Sørensen (2004) shows that in the presence
of lump sum transfers, tax competition results in overprovision of public goods. Finally, in Justman et al.
(2001) entry and exit of regions in the location market can explain excessive investment in infrastructure.
26This is in contrast to Bougheas et al. (2003), where coordination should always increase eﬃciency.
In contrast to Bucovetsky (2004), an equilibrium with underprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms
cannot arise.
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core-periphery patterns in the EU and to redistribute these rents among union members.
This is a further argument against the current design of Structural Funds in the EU. As put
forward by Bougheas et al (2003, p. 904), these funds do not account for coordination
failures in the national provision of public infrastructure, but are aimed at economic
growth and the recovery of regions that are underdeveloped by comparison with the
European community average. However, even the goal of a (more or less) uniform level
of infrastructure quality is disputable since it comes at cost of eﬃciency if agglomerative
forces are at work. Moreover, our results indicate that there is no need to compensate
for national underprovision of public support for Þrms. To the contrary, if there is need
for coordination at all, the problem is that national governments are inclined to do too
much for making settlement of Þrms attractive. This should be taken into account when
deciding about the Structural Funds after their expiration in 2006.
7 Discussion
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we investigate in which way our results depend
upon the simplifying assumption that public infrastructure expenditures reduce Þxed costs
but let marginal costs of input production unaﬀected. Second, we discuss Þrm subsidies
as an instrument of competitive location policy (in contrast to public infrastructure in-
vestment).
7.1 Public Infrastructure Investments and variable production
costs
The analysis in Sections 5-6 builds upon the assumption that higher public infrastructure
expenditures lower Þxed costs but do not aﬀect variable costs of input production. To see
how important this simplifying assumption is for our results, we brießy discuss the role of
public expenditures that aim at reducing variable production costs. Such a modiÞcation
makes the analysis much more complicated and we are not able to provide a full analytical
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treatment. To gain insights into the main mechanisms at work, we Þrst consider a situation
without international outsourcing, for which analytical results can be derived. For the
more challenging model variant with intermediate input trade, we refer to simulation
results.
Infrastructure investment which lowers variable production costs leads to lower inter-
mediate input prices, according to the constant markup rule in the Ethier model (with
constant elasiticy of substitution between input varieties). As a consequence, the contri-
bution margin declines and Þrms must sell a larger volume of output to cover the given
level of Þxed costs. This tends to reduce the number of input producers that can survive
in the market. At the same time, the price reduction leads to an increase in the demand
for diﬀerentiated inputs. This makes it easier to cover Þxed costs and has a positive eﬀect
on the number of Þrms. In general, it is not clear, which of the two eﬀects dominates (see
Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 1996). However, since the factor return to capital is exogenous
in our model, condition 0 < α < ρ < 1 is suﬃcient for a positive Þrm number eﬀect.27
Summing up, in the model variant without intermediate goods trade both output per Þrm
and the number of input producers increase if public infrastructure investment lowers the
variable cost of input production. Hence, CES-index X and, by virtue of (1) and (3), also
the factor return to immobile labor are positively aﬀected by such a policy intervention.
In a set of simulations we have investigated the robustness of these Þndings under
international outsourcing of input production.28 The numerical results show that eﬀects
on domestic Þrm number and wages identiÞed above extend to a setting with intermedi-
ate goods trade. Opposite eﬀects are triggered in the foreign economy, where intensiÞed
competition leads to an exit of input producers and the wage rate declines. This is, due
to the existence of transport costs and the associated home bias in the use of intermediate
inputs for Þnal goods production. (Note the similarity to the results in Section 5.) More-
27For formal details, see Section 2 of Egger, H., and J. Falkinger, 2002, Industry Concentration, In-
ternational Outsourcing and Economic Fundamentals, mimeo. This working paper is available under the
following link: http://www.wwi.unizh.ch/research/wp/wp_egger/Egger_Falkinger.pdf.
28The program code for the simulations in Mathematica 5.0 is available from the authors upon request.
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over, if input producers serve both the local and the foreign market, they do not only
adjust the level of output to a reduction in variable production costs but also react by
changes in their production pattern (i.e. xkk/x
k0
k rises). Finally, simulation results conÞrm
that the welfare eﬀects of infrastructure investment, reducing variable production costs
are qualitatively the same as those derived in Section 6.
7.2 Subsidies as an Alternative to Public Infrastructure Invest-
ment
So far our analysis has not allowed for any rivalry in the use of public infrastructure by
Þrms. Although a complete analysis of impure public infrastructure goods provision is
beyond the scope of our paper, we want to address an extreme form of rivalry in the use
of public expenditures, namely Þrm subsidies. Suppose that the government subsidizes
Þxed costs f 0k of each Þrm locating in country k by an amount Gk < f
0
k . Thus,
fk (Gk) = f
0
k −Gk (23)
and
T k = nk (Gk)Gk, k = H,F , (24)
where nk (Gk) is the equilibrium number of Þrms under Þxed costs fk (Gk). (Again, we
focus on interior solutions so that nk > 0.) It is straightforward to show that T k is an
increasing function in Gk. Evaluating W k = W k0 − T k at Gk = 0 we get29
∂W k0
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
>
∂T k
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
. (25)
Hence, it is always beneÞcial for an individual country to provide some subsidy to foster
entry of intermediate goods producers. Two forces are responsible for this result: The
29 ∂Tk
∂Gk
¯¯¯
Gk=0
= nk (0), according to (24), and
∂Wk0
∂Gk
¯¯¯
Gk=0
= (B−1)φC
k
1−( rr+t )
2(σ−1)
³
1
xkk
´B ¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
, according to
(10), (14) and the fact that B = eB + 1. Note further that Ak < (B − 1)φCk, because of α < ρ < 1.
Combining these facts with (9) we get (25).
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external economies of scale arising from the positive impact of the number of Þrms on pro-
ductivity, and the positive home-market eﬀect of Þrm location, induced by the transaction
costs for intermediate goods trade. Since welfare in the partner country k0 is negatively
aﬀected by the Þxed cost subsidy in k, Þrm subsidies are a controversial political issue in
a free trade agreement. Interestingly, we have30
∂
¡
W k0 +W
k0
0
¢
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
¯
Gk=0
>
∂T k
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
, (26)
so that subsidizing entry of intermediate goods producers in country k a bit is also beneÞ-
cial from the perspective of the FTA. Nonetheless, policy coordination may be necessary
to avoid overprovision of national Þrm subsidies. In addition, supranational redistribu-
tion may be required if equalization of locational attractiveness is a political goal, like for
instance in the EU.31
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we set up a model with one Þnal good and diﬀerentiated intermediate in-
puts that are assembled by the use of immobile labor. We investigate how the location
of intermediate input suppliers, international outsourcing and wages are aﬀected by de-
cisions on public infrastructure investment in two member countries of a FTA. We Þnd
that national public infrastructure investment, which reduces Þxed costs for intermediate
input production, raises the number of input suppliers, reduces international outsourcing
activities of Þnal goods producers and leads to higher wages in the home country. The
30 ∂
!
Wk0 +W
k0
0
"
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
= (B−1)φC
k
Ak
nk (0), according to (9), (10), (14) and the facts that B = eB + 1 and
Ck
0
Ck
=
µ
L
k0
L
k
¶B
. Using Ak < (B − 1)φCk we conclude ∂
!
Wk0 +W
k0
0
"
∂Gk
¯¯¯¯
Gk=0
> nk (0) =
∂Tk
∂Gk
¯¯¯
Gk=0
.
31The role of subsidies as a public input has been discussed in Kind et al. (2000). In their analysis
subsidies (i.e., a negative tax rate on capital) as an outcome of Þscal competition are most likely in a
symmetric equilibrium, in which production is not concentrated. In contrast to this, our analysis points
to the role of Þrm subsidies for explaining core-periphery patterns in industrial production. To put it
diﬀerently, subsidies can explain ex-post diﬀerences of ex-ante symmetric countries.
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opposite holds in the partner country, where the number of produced varieties and the
return to the immobile factor decline, whereas international outsourcing is stimulated.
In a second step we investigate the role of public infrastructure investment as a com-
petitive location policy of national governments which aim to maximize gross national
income minus (lump-sum) tax payments. Since governments do not take into account the
negative eﬀects of location policy on the FTA partner country, policy coordination may
result in a higher overall FTA-welfare level. More speciÞcally, non-cooperative policies
may result in overprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms. Moreover, there are distri-
butional conßicts. In particular, core-periphery patterns can arise even among ex ante
symmetric countries. Indeed, core-periphery patterns may also be the result of FTA-
income maximizing policy coordination.
To study the robustness of our results with respect to the assumption on the cost eﬀects
of infrastructure provision, we have discussed public expenditures which aim at reducing
variable costs of input production. It turns out that such a modiÞcation does not change
our main qualitative results. We have also investigated the role of Þrm subsidies as an
instrument of competitive location policy. Thereby, it is shown that some subsidization of
entry of intermediate goods suppliers is beneÞcial for both the individual country and the
FTA. However, policy coordination may be required to avoid overprovision of subsidies
or to reach the goal of equalization of locational attractiveness.
Concerning policy implications for regional trading blocs like the EU, our analysis
provides the following insights. Generally, structural funds that are aimed at economic
growth and the recovery of regions should explicitly account for coordination failures
of national infrastructure provision and potential eﬃciency losses of a uniform level of
infrastructure quality. More speciÞcally, the analysis suggests three conclusions: First, an
optimal infrastructure policy from an integrated point of view may result in signiÞcantly
diﬀerent levels of national infrastructure qualities paired with side payments to reach
distributional goals within the union. Second, there is no need to compensate at the
EU level for national underprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms. Third, national
measures of subsidizing Þrm entry are not necessarily ineﬃciency generating distortions
29
to be hindered by a central authority. However, to avoid overprovision of subsidies in the
strategic locational competition between governments, some upper bound of Þrm subsidies
may be required.
Appendix
Appendix A.1: Derivation of EquilibriumPrices, Quantities, Firm
Numbers and Wages
The Þrst-order conditions for (5) and (6) give us xkk = (ρDk/r)
σ, xk
0
k = (ρDk0/ (r + t))
σ
and thus
xkk0 = x
k
k
µ
r
r + t
¶σ
, (A.1)
with k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}. Because of iso-elastic demand, equilibrium prices are given by
pkk =
r
ρ
and pk
0
k =
r + t
ρ
. (A.2)
This implies
pk
0
k = p
k
k
r + t
r
. (A.3)
ProÞts of a Þrm in k are given by
πk =
¡
pkk − r
¢
xkk +
³
pk
0
k − r − t
´
xk
0
k − fk, (A.4)
so that in view of (A.1) the zero-proÞt condition reduces to
xkk = ak − b xk
0
k0 , (A.5)
with ak :=
fk
pkk−r
= ρfk
(1−ρ)r (use (A.2)) and b :=
pk
0
k −r−t
pkk−r
¡
r
r+t
¢σ
=
¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1
(use again (A.2)).
In an analogous way,
xk
0
k0 = ak0 − b xkk, (A.6)
with ak0 := ak
fk0
fk
. Solving the system of equations given by (A.5) and (A.6), we get
xkk =
ak − ak0b
1− b2 =
h
fk − fk0
¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1i
φ
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1) , (A.7)
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with φ := ρ
(1−ρ)r and k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}.
Next, we derive the equilibrium number of Þrms. Since Þrms within countries are
symmetric we have Xk =
£
nk
¡
xkk
¢ρ
+ nk0
¡
xkk0
¢ρ¤1/ρ
, with k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}. In view of
(A.1) this reduces to
Xk = xkk
"
nk + nk0
µ
r
r + t
¶ ρ
1−ρ
#1/ρ
. (A.8)
Moreover, using (A.2) and the deÞnition of P kX we get
P kX =
µ
r
ρ
¶1−σ "
nk + nk0
µ
r + t
r
¶1−σ#
. (A.9)
Since 1− σ = − ρ
1−ρ we conclude from this
Xk = xkk
¡
P kX
¢ 1
ρ
µ
r
ρ
¶ 1
1−ρ
. (A.10)
Using (A.2) in demand function xkk =
¡
pkk
¢− 1
1−ρ αY k
PkX
, we get xkk =
³
r
ρ
´−σ
αY k/P kX which
in view of Y k =
¡
Xk
¢α ³
L
k
´1−α
and (A.10) reduces to
xkk = α
1
1−αL
k
µ
r
ρ
¶− 1
1−ρ ¡
P kX
¢ α−ρ
ρ(1−α) . (A.11)
In view of (A.9) this can be rewritten as
xkk =
³αρ
r
´ 1
1−α
(Nk)
α−ρ
ρ(1−α) L
k
, (A.12)
with Nk := nk+nk0
¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1
. An analogous expression holds for xk
0
k0 . After straightforward
transformations, (A.12) can be rewritten as
nk + nk0
µ
r
r + t
¶σ−1
= Ak
¡
1/xkk
¢B
(A.13)
and in a similar way we obtain
nk0 + nk
µ
r
r + t
¶σ−1
= Ak
0
³
1/xk
0
k0
´B
, (A.14)
with k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}. B = ρ(1−α)
ρ−α and A
k =
¡
αρ
r
¢ B
1−α
³
L
k
´B
have been used. (A.13)
and (A.14) give us (9).
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In a Þnal step, we derive equilibrium wages. Using Xk = xkk
h
nk + nk0
¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1i1/ρ
,
k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F} , and nk + nk0
¡
r
r+t
¢
= Ak
³
1
xkk
´B
, according to (A.13), we obtain
Xk =
¡
Ak
¢1/ρµ 1
xkk
¶ !B/α
, (A.15)
where eB = α³B
ρ
− 1
´
> 0. Then, (10) directly follows from (1), (3) and (A.15). ¥
Appendix A.2: Proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 4
In the following derivations, Þxed costs in country F are given by fF and GH ∈
£
0, GH
£
holds.
Proof of Proposition 1
Use (8), (9) and (13) to Þnd
dnH
dGH
= −
AHBφ
½³
1
xHH
´B+1
+
¡
r
r+t
¢2(σ−1) ³LF
L
H
´B ³
1
xFF
´B+1¾
h
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1)i2 dfPHdGH > 0 (A.16)
and
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L
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1
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r+t
¢2(σ−1)i2 dfPHdGH < 0. (A.17)
Moreover,
d (nH + nF )
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AHBφ
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1− ¡ r
r+t
¢σ−1i½³ 1
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(A.18)
Since dfPH/dGH < 0,
d(nH+nF )
dGH
R 0 if and only if
³
xFF
xHH
´B+1
R
³
L
F
L
H
´B ¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1
. Accord-
ing to (12),
³
xFF
xHH
´B
>
³
L
F
L
H
´B ¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1
. However, this is only suﬃcient for
³
xFF
xHH
´B+1
>
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³
L
F
L
H
´B ¡
r
r+t
¢σ−1
if xFF ≥ xHH , i.e., according to (8), if fF ≥ fH . Thus, d(nH+nF )dGH > 0 if
fH (GH) ≤ fF and ambiguous otherwise.32 ¥
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Public infrastructure investment and the volume of international outsourcing:
Use (8) and (13) to obtain
dxHH
dGH
=
φ
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1) dfPHdGH < 0 (A.18)
and
dxFH
dGH
= −
µ
r
r + t
¶2σ−1
dxHH
dGH
> 0, (A.19)
according to (A.1) and (A.6). Then,
d(nHxFH)
dGH
= dnH
dGH
xFH + nH
dxFH
dGH
> 0 directly follows
from (A.16). In a similar way, use (A.17) and dx
H
F
dGH
=
¡
r
r+t
¢σ dxHH
dGH
< 0 to Þnd
d(nF xHF )
dGH
=
dnF
dGH
xHF + nF
dxHF
dGH
< 0.
Step 2: Public infrastructure investment and the international outsourcing intensity:
According to (8), ξH =
nF x
H
F
nHx
H
H
can be written as ξH =
nF
nH
¡
r
r+t
¢σ
and ξF =
nH
nF
¡
r
r+t
¢σ
.
Then, dξH
dGH
< 0 and dξF
dGH
> 0, follow from (A.16) and (A.17). ¥
Proof of Proposition 4
Using fPk (Gk) = Gk − Gk, k = H,F , in (13) and substituting (8) for xkk in (10) we get
from (16)
dµ (Gk0)
dGk0
= −
eBCkφ ¡ r
r+t
¢σ−1 ·¡
1/xkk
¢ !B+1 ¯¯¯
Gk=Gk
− ¡1/xkk¢ !B+1 ¯¯¯
Gk=0
¸
h
1− ¡ r
r+t
¢2(σ−1)i
Gk
< 0, (A.20)
for all Gk0 ∈
£
0, Gk0
£
, k 6= k0 ∈ {H,F}. This and the fact that µk (Gk0) was deÞned as the
threshold at which the government is indiﬀerent between Gk = 0 and Gk = Gk establish
the proposition. ¥
32The ambiguity in the sign of d(nH+nF )dGH for fF < fH (GH) has been shown in a simulation analysis.
The respective paramteter values and the program code for Mathematica 5.0 are available from the
authors upon request.
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